

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This volume introduces and presents a number of less well-known writings by Viktor Frankl, translated from the original German, in which he forthrightly relates psychology to religious concepts. These cast a strong, new light on the generally received understanding of Frankl's contribution to psychology – “logotherapy”. The final sentence of one of these essays, “Ten Theses concerning the ‘Person’” is emblematic of their content:

The true discovery of the human, the *inventio hominis*, occurs in the *imitatio Dei* [the imitation of G-d].

This sentence is remarkable not because it contains any novelty in itself – it expresses a basic notion of millennia of religious teaching and belief. It is remarkable because it was stated by a great psychologist *as a proposition of psychology*. In another of the pieces in this volume, “The Science of the Soul”, Frankl writes that psychology is ultimately enclosed within a more comprehensive, theological dimension.

I like to say that logotherapy is open – and indeed its hallmark is its openness – to a dimension which other schools of psychotherapy are not. This is the theological dimension, which encompasses the anthropological dimension and therefore also psychotherapy (which is within the anthropological dimension)...

Why then do I use the word “dimension”? This word is meant to emphasize not a formal ontological distinction between theology and psychotherapy, but rather what I call a relationship of inclusion. In English, one says: “The higher dimension is the more inclusive one”. That is to say, between these individual dimensions, there is not mutual exclusivity, but, to the contrary,

a relationship of inclusion. Put differently, the truth of the one can never contradict the truth of the other (for psychology is situated *within* the wider framework of theology). Indeed, the fact is that only within the higher dimension is the specific reality of the lower dimension illuminated.

The task of the Introduction to these writings of Frankl in this volume is to clarify from the standpoint of this encompassing “dimension” of religious teaching and tradition, acknowledged by Frankl, two aspects of Frankl’s work: (1) Frankl’s own “logotherapy” with its model of human personality and (2) the seemingly paradoxical goal of Frankl, set out in the Introduction, of a reclamation of the psychotherapy of Sigmund Freud. “Paradoxical”, for whilst Frankl’s work proceeds from a *rejection* of the fundamental assumptions of Freudian psychoanalysis, he at the same time wanted to *redeem* it for a synthesis with his own Logotherapy.

The teaching of religious tradition, the dimension which, in Frankl’s words, is “inclusive” and descriptive of the true nature of the human being, and hence of bearing for psychology, is the tradition from Mount Sinai, which he, as a believing Jew, affirmed. At Sinai, G-d gave both the Ten Commandments, the core of a comprehensive revelation which is the text of the Bible or Pentateuch, the “Written Law, *and* its commentary or elucidation, known as the “Oral Law”. Moreover, the tradition from Sinai contains two strands: the laws given to humanity in *general*, known as the Noahide laws, and the laws given *additionally and specifically* to the Jewish people. The former bear the title “Noahide” since those laws were first communicated to humanity in its beginnings and were completed with the survivor of the biblical flood, Noah. The Noahide laws constitute a Divine moral covenant with all of Noah’s descendants, that is to say, with humanity at large. Nevertheless, it was the reiteration of the Noahide laws at Sinai which gave them their definitive form and authority. The detail of the Noahide laws, which constitute the shared root of the great world faiths and cultures, is discussed in my book, *The Theory and Practice of Universal Ethics – the Noahide Laws*¹, as in others, and are discussed briefly in the Introduction to this book. Their actuality today is as vital as ever. Even though Frankl himself was Jewish, the Introduction makes it clear that it is this *universal* aspect of the religious tradition from Sinai, the Noahide laws, rather than the additional, specific Jewish laws, which pertain to his psychology.

The psychologist Viktor Frankl was a person of great deed and thought. He

¹ NY: Institute for Judaism and Civilization, 2014.

was not a theologian, although, as noted, he wished to place psychology under the ultimate aegis of theology: “the truth of the one can never contradict the truth of the other”. By that criterion we are bound, at the very outset, to point to a contradiction or vicissitude in Frankl’s work which expresses itself in relation to a key statement of his in this volume, which we have already quoted: “The true discovery of the human, the *inventio hominis*, occurs in the *imitatio Dei* [the imitation of G-d]”. This was removed and a number of fundamental changes made in a later, “modified version” of the “Ten Theses concerning the ‘Person’”². It is of the greatest importance here to show why the religious tradition – the higher, “inclusive” dimension – upholds Frankl’s first version and rejects his second version. In the following we set out the two versions³, one after the other, and then analyse the differences, on the basis of which it will be clear that, for the tradition, the first version is the authentic one.

The first version of the ninth and tenth of the “Ten Theses”, which appears in this volume, reads as follows:

9. *An animal is not a person* because it cannot elevate itself above itself, or take up a position against itself. That is why the animal does not have the correlate of the person: it has no [morally shaped] world, but only a [conditioning] environment. Extrapolating from the relation animal-human or environment-world, we arrive at the personal G-d and His “worldly” correlate, the “higher world”. As the highest spiritual being facing the human being, G-d is at least [spiritual] “person” – in truth, That which is higher than person. All statements about Him could [only] be by way of analogy.

10. *The person is* to be understood finally as *the likeness of G-d*. The human can comprehend him- or herself only from the perspective of transcendence. The human *is* human only insofar as he grasps himself in relation to G-d. He *is* a person only in the measure that he personifies transcendence: tuned and resonant with the summons of transcendence. The summons of transcendence is heard in the conscience. The conscience is the registry of transcendence.

²The modified version was drawn to my attention by Professor Alexander Batthyány. It was recently republished as an appendage to a new printing of V. Frankl, *Ärztliche Seelsorge – Grundlagen der Logotherapie und Existenzanalyse* (ed. Alexander Batthyány), Vienna: Franz Deuticke, 2005.

³The translation of the second version is also that of the present writer.

As little as a human being is what he is in the dimension of immanence [simply being in the world], so little does he [within that perspective] experience what he should be: he is thus unable to “project” [*entwerfen*] and “discover” himself, as an atheistic existentialism imagined he can. The true discovery of the human, the *inventio hominis*, occurs in the *imitatio Dei* [the imitation of G-d].

The revised, second version of the ninth and tenth theses reads:

9. *An animal is not a person* because it cannot elevate itself above itself, or take up a position against itself. That is why the animal does not have the correlate of the person: it has no [morally shaped] world, but only a [conditioning] environment. Extrapolating from the animal-human relation or environment-world, we arrive at a [concept of a] “Supra-world”. If we want to characterise the relationship between the (narrow) animal environment to the (wider) world of the person and beyond that to (an all-encompassing) Supra-world, the analogy of the “golden ratio” is useful. [The principle of the “golden ratio”] states that [where a rectangle is divided into a smaller and larger part] the ratio of the smaller part to the larger part, is the same as the ratio of the larger part to the whole [of the rectangle]. Let us take the example of a monkey, which receives painful injections in order to test a serum. Within the horizon of its environment, it is in no position to comprehend the considerations of the human being, who has inserted it into his or her experiment. This is because the human world, the world of meaning and values, is inaccessible to it. It cannot come close to them. It cannot come to this – it does not enter that dimension. Now, are we not compelled to accept that the human world itself, and for its part, is surmounted by a world, which in turn the human cannot access? [Is not that world] with its meaning – its “supra-meaning” – which would alone could make all the human being’s suffering meaningful [equally inaccessible to the human]?

Exactly as little as the animal, from the horizon of its environment, can grasp the overarching world of the human, so little can the human grasp the “Supra-world”, other than through an intuitive reaching out – though faith. A domesticated animal

does not know the purposes to which the human being sets it. How then should the person know what supra-meaning the world as a whole is called to?

10. The person grasps him- or herself only from the standpoint of transcendence. Moreover, one is a person only to the degree that one understands oneself from the standpoint of transcendence. He *is* a person only to the extent that his person is formed by [the standpoint of transcendence]: tuned by, and resonant with, the summons of transcendence. This summons of transcendence finds its reception in the conscience.

For logotherapy, religion is, and can only be, an object, not [its] standpoint. Logotherapy must operate in the practical, innerworldly realm, away from revealed religion. [It must] respond to the question of meaning [practically without posing] an either/or of a theistic and atheistic worldview. When [logotherapy] grasps belief not as belief in G-d, but rather as a comprehensive belief in a meaning, [only] then is it entirely legitimate to concern and occupy itself with belief. Then it agrees with Albert Einstein, who said that to pose the question of the meaning of life is to be religious. [Frankl here inserts a footnote (no. 5): “Religion, vis-à-vis belief in meaning, could ultimately be said to be a radicalisation of the “will to meaning”; specifically inasmuch as it has to do with a “will towards ultimate meaning”, indeed, a “will to supra-meaning”].

Meaning is a [boundary] wall, behind which we cannot go – which we much rather need to take on as assumed. We have to accept this ultimate [assumed] meaning, because we cannot question it. The reason we can't is because every attempt to answer the meaning of existence always presupposes the existence of a meaning. In short, the belief in meaning in a person is, in the sense of Kant, a transcendental [–a prior, framing–] category. We know, since Kant, that it is somehow meaningless to question categories like space and time, simply because we do not think – and so cannot question – without already presupposing space and time. Exactly the same applies to human existence: it is always oriented to meaning, however little one may be aware of it. There is always something like a prior sense

of meaning and a foreknowledge of meaning and it is the sense of meaning that forms the basis of what logotherapy calls the “will to meaning”. Whether one wants it or not, whether one realizes it or not, the human being believes in a meaning as long as one breathes.

Even the suicide believes in a meaning – if not that of life, of living on, then that of dying. If the [suicide] really believed in no meaning, no kind of meaning, he or she would not actually be able to stir a finger to proceed to the act of suicide.

The differences between these two versions are profound. The revised versions of each of ninth and tenth theses are far longer than the original ones. This is necessarily so, for Frankl had to deal with the consequences of their change of stance. Schematically, the differences (with their consequences) between the two versions are as follows: (1) In the first version, Frankl speaks of G-d as an objective reality. In the second, “G-d” is replaced by the term “transcendence” in the sense of an assumed or elected “comprehensive” meaning. In fact, the straightforward language of religious belief in the first version seems in the second to succumb to a scepticism: a person can claim as little knowledge of an ultimate reality (if this is what we call G-d) as an animal has of the world of human purpose and meaning. Religion is simply a *species* of meaning, one characterized by “a will to a Supra-meaning”. In the second version, G-d ceases to be absolute. (2) In the first version, the description of the human as spiritually fitted to accomplish the “imitation of G-d” implies an objective, universal ethics, in which that “imitation” consists. In the second version, objective values are replaced by a relativism of meanings. “Religion” has no more significance than asking the meaning of life. Its answer has no priority over any other answer. (3) In the first version, and as brought out by the essays in this volume, “meaning” – worthy of the name – is a *labour of self-transcendence*. It is this act of self-transcendence which places the “secular” individual on the same trajectory or route to G-d as the religious person (who has reached its terminus) – even if that person presently considers him- or herself an agnostic or atheist⁴. For self-transcendence leads to that which is rigorously transcendent: G-d. Genuine self-transcendence leads everyone ultimately to the same meaning, the same universal ethics, (the “imitation of G-d”) which can

⁴ See Frankl’s explicit rejection of “the bifurcation between atheistic and theistic Weltanschauung” in his “Oskar Pfister Award Lecture” quoted below in Chapter 1 of the Introduction, footnote 30.

be applied and refracted in one's own particular circumstances. In the second version, "meaning" is simply a *fact* (like a Kantian transcendental *a priori*) of human existence. People always *have* – different – meanings and this why, according to this view, a theistic world-view is no more "meaningful" than an atheistic one (which Frankl explicitly rejected in the first version). They are both *immanent* factual descriptions of actually subscribed meanings. (4) In the second version, the scepticism towards the Divine, the moral relativism and the characterization of meaning as "fact" rather than the product of a labour of self-transcendence leads to a validation even of suicide as a "meaningful" act. The writings of Frankl consistent with the first version make it clear that "responsibility" means answering to *life's* demands, to a mission or purpose for *existing*. In the second version, which defines meaning as "factually" held, even the suicide's purported "reason" for suicide is acceptable: one's existence was underlain by a "meaning" which *led* to suicide. The religious tradition, explicitly embraced by the first version, further prohibits suicide as a species of killing because in destroying life (where there is no clear warrant) it destroys Divine property – the Divine likeness stamped in the human being. Indeed, even the great, self-confessedly "religiously tone-deaf" sociologist Max Weber "knew that no redemption religion approves suicide, 'a death which has been hallowed only by philosophies.'"⁵

The Viktor Frankl, who authored the essays in this volume, is a believer – *as a psychologist* – in an objective G-d. He believes in objective values and that these morally structure human personality. He maintains that the soul is a reality within the human being and that its unique manifestation is self-transcendence. And he was utterly committed to life, to finding reasons for living, in the most difficult of circumstances.

In response to my query, Professor Alex Batthyány communicated to me that he believes that the revision of the last two theses took place "somewhere in the late 1950s/early 1960s". Indeed, in Frankl's book, *The Will to Meaning*⁶, based on lectures given in the United States in 1966, one finds passages which reproduce the language of the revision of the ninth and tenth Theses. There self-transcendence is defined simply as reaching beyond oneself, and to others

⁵ Preface to the translation by H.H. Gerth and D. Martindale, *Ancient Judaism*, N.Y.: The Free Press, 1952, p. xiii and the quote from Weber comes from *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, tr. by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, NY: 1946, p. 356.

⁶ *The Will to Meaning, Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy*, NY: Plume, 1970.

– people, ideas and things – within the immanent realm of life⁷ without any requirement that this self-transcendence transcend towards a transcendental Absolute, Which stands beyond and sets a moral standard *for life*.

In line with the second version of the Ten Theses, in *The Will to Meaning*, Frankl fully acknowledges what he calls the moral “neutralism” of this stance, and also anticipates and answers an obvious challenge to it:

It follows that a psychotherapist must not impose a value on the patient. The patient must be referred to his own conscience. And if I am asked, as I am time and time again, whether this neutralism would have to be maintained even in the case of Hitler, I answer in the affirmative, because I am convinced that Hitler would never have become what he did unless he had not suppressed within himself the voice of conscience⁸.

Here, however, the question must in turn be raised to Frankl’s answer: *when* do we say that conscience has been “suppressed” and *what* are our criteria for saying so? The question cannot be answered without an objective (as distinct from a “neutral”) framework of values. Frankl continues from the foregoing paragraph:

It goes without saying that in emergency cases the therapist need not stick to his neutralism. In the face of a suicidal risk it is perfectly legitimate to intervene because only an erroneous conscience will ever command a person to commit suicide. The statement parallels my conviction that only an erroneous conscience will ever command a person to commit homicide, or – once more to refer to Hitler – genocide⁹.

Frankl adds that the Hippocratic oath *also* requires the therapist to steer the patient away from suicide, but without this, he here deems suicidal ideation and homicide as products of “erroneous” conscience. The same question arises with regard to “erroneous” conscience as does with his notion of “suppressed” conscience: by what standard is conscience “erroneous”? These questions can be answered only by reference to a universal values framework. What is that framework? The answer of religious tradition and the Frankl of the first version

⁷“Human beings are transcending themselves towards meanings which are something other than themselves, which are more than mere expressions of their selves, more than mere projections of these selves”, *ibid.*, p. 60.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

of the Theses is that it is the law of the transcendental G-d, Who stated at Mount Sinai “You shall not kill”. That is not all that G-d commanded humanity. He also reiterated for humanity a further six Noahide laws, and commanded them to a humanity fashioned with a soul (conscience) capable of resonating with, and through the practical observance of these laws “imitating G-d”, should they exercise their free will to do so.

Strangely, having spoken in *The Will to Meaning* of suicide as the product of “erroneous conscience” Frankl, in the same book, again reverts to a “value-neutralism” in regard to suicidal ideation, in words almost identical with the revised version of the tenth Thesis:

...it is my contention that man really could not move a limb unless deep down to the foundations of existence, and out of the depths of being, he is imbued by a basic trust in the ultimate meaning. Without it he would have to stop breathing. Even a person who commits suicide must be convinced that suicide makes sense.¹⁰

Professor Batthyány further communicated to me that, notwithstanding Frankl’s revision of the Theses, Frankl “appears to me to gain in spiritual depth, and by no means did he, at that time, disavow...his faith, on the contrary.” Indeed, the dialogue, from which “The Science of the Soul”, in this volume, is taken, was held in 1984 – well after the second version was written – and yet it expresses the same *pristine religiosity* as the first version of the “Ten Theses”. It seems that an ambiguity, arising from the clash of the positions of the first and the second versions of the Ten Theses, continues to run through Frankl’s work. This neither disturbs nor deters the undertaking of this volume, which is to present some of Frankl’s writings of Frankl, consistent with his first position and with religious tradition, and to seek to elaborate their profound contribution in the Introduction. There are great resources for psychology in this strand of the work of Viktor Frankl, which aligns with, and rests upon, millennia-long religious tradition with its understanding and experience of what the human being is.

Whilst we proceed no further into, nor seek to explain, ambiguity of position in Frankl’s work, there is good reason to have mentioned it here, beyond the requirements of scholarly thoroughness. It is that psychology in general, and those following in Frankl’s footsteps in particular, need to address the question – which the clash of positions raises – of whether there is an objective

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 150-51.

moral structure to the healthy human personality, and if so, what the source and content of that moral structure is.

This question comes before contemporary psychiatry with new force. Empirical psychology has come to recognize the high positive correlation of mental health and religious belief¹¹. This is, moreover, no oddity for some 84% of the world's population is religiously affiliated.¹² And, as we shall see, Frankl argued that the exercise of self-transcendence brings the “atheist” and the “agnostic” also into the realm of spiritual sensitivity. Notwithstanding the acknowledged relevance of religion to human and their mental health, three questions continue to nag at contemporary psychology. (1) Can psychology know whether certain religious beliefs are “healthy” and others “unhealthy”, the latter in fact furnishing either or both causes and symptoms of mental illness? (2) Should psychology's stance towards different religious beliefs be relative and neutral? (3) How can therapist and patient, in a therapy which welcomes the spiritual, yet relate to one another over the divide of their different religious-cultural perspectives?

Frankl's thought, as presented in these essays and the Introduction to them in this volume, answers each of these questions. The answer to the first question is that the “healthiness” of religious belief is measured by the extent to which it expresses genuine self-transcendence (as distinct from serving as a veneer for psychophysical or ideological interests); and also in terms of its coherence with literate historical monotheism, as Frankl writes in “Time and Responsibility”. Psychologists *as psychologists* may not assess beliefs. That is the province of the “higher, inclusive dimension” – purified, self-transcending religion, situated in literate tradition – which the therapist needs to consult.

The second question, whether psychology should take a wholly neutral, relativistic stand towards the differing beliefs of patients, is prompted by the answer to the first: that *some* beliefs *are* clearly pathological. What then of the rest – should their apparent diversity lead to an attitude of value-neutrality and relativism towards them? We shall see that Gordon Allport in *The Individual and His Religion* sought to practice relativism within a narrow “bandwidth” of what he regarded as “mature religion”, as distinct from “authoritarian...

¹¹ See H. G. Koenig et al., *Handbook of Religion and Health*, 2nd Ed'n, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

¹² Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life. 84% of world's population religiously affiliated. Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life. See: <https://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/18/global-religious-landscape-exec/>

immature religion”. With this he sought to accommodate a liberal democratic ideal of the individual’s – and presumably society’s aggregate – freedom to posit values. We see that Allport’s limited relativism, expressed in liberal-democratic America in 1949, has seventy years later capsized into full-scale relativism. The moral compass, which he and his contemporaries inherited from religious parents and grandparents and still bounded the scope of acceptable choices, has in many western societies been lost. Not every or any value, which arises from choice, is acceptable. The Viktor Frankl of the essays contained in this volume believed in the objectivity of universal values as rooted in the objectivity and universality of the human soul, the identity and “discovery” of which was to be found in the soul’s imitation of G-d.

The third question, how the therapist is to relate to the patient on matters of the spirit across the divide of the particularities of their respective beliefs, is also resolved, as explained in the Introduction, by the coalescence of Frankl’s sense of universal values with the Noahide laws. The latter are to be understood as the historical root and resonant common core of the world religions. These values represent the refined common denominator of the world faiths. The differences are particularities. The interaction of the therapist and patient is primarily on this common ground, to which both inherently can come to relate. Consequently, the therapist can obviate the burdensome task of taking a full “spiritual history” of the patient of a different culture, by being versed in this common core of shared human spirituality, without all the cultural particularities. The therapist can readily observe the professional injunctions not to “proselytize” nor to “undermine” the faith of the patient, since both therapist and patient are required to step out of their particular belief frameworks into the domain of a common spirituality. It is sufficient that the therapist be versed in the elements of this common spirituality and be a conduit for the self-transcendence, the spirituality, of the patient. Frankl’s work, as presented and elucidated here, shows how spirituality may be applied to psychology: in the logotherapeutic awakening of the human spirit combined with psychotherapeutic healing of personality in accordance with the norms set for heart and mind by the human spirit.

This book combines two monographs previously published by the Institute for Judaism and Civilization. One, fundamentally revised here, was published as *The Human Being in the Image of the Divine: The Psychology of Viktor E. Frankl* (Melbourne: Institute for Judaism and Civilization, 2017). In its new form, it is the Introduction to the section of translations of Frankl’s writings. The

second, which preceded it, contained four of the five writings of Viktor Frankl included here, and was published as *The Rediscovery of the Human – Basic Early Texts of Viktor E. Frankl* (Melbourne: Institute for Judaism and Civilization, 2014, Second Edition). The “Science of the Soul” has been added here.

The “Introduction” draws substantially on, and in many places reproduces *verbatim* parts of, earlier essays or writings of mine: “Viktor Frankl: Person, Philosopher and Therapist”, published in the *Journal of Judaism and Civilization*, Vol. 7 (2005); “Human Personality: The Psychological Matrix of the Noahide Laws” of my *The Theory and Practice of Universal Ethics – the Noahide Laws*, N.Y.: Institute for Judaism and Civilization, 2014; my book-review essay, “Freud and the Mystical Religious Tradition”, published in *Journal of Judaism and Civilization*, Vol. 11 (2016); a segment of my contribution to a forum on “The Encounter of Freud and the Fifth Lubavitcher Rebbe”, published in the *Journal of Judaism and Civilization*, Vol. 2 (1999); “The Concept of a Person: Reflections on Judaism and Psychotherapy”, published in the *Journal of Judaism and Civilization*, Vol. 1 (1998); “Universal Religion, Viktor Frankl and Gordon Allport” in the *Journal of Judaism and Civilization*, Vol. 4 (2002); and “Historical Agreements of Psychology and Religion” published in the *Journal of Judaism and Civilization*, Vol. 10 (2014). All this material is reproduced with permission.

The second part, “Translations” from Frankl’s writings have also been previously published. “Time and Responsibility” is my translation of Frankl’s short book, *Zeit und Verantwortung* (Vienna: Franz Deuticke Verlag, 1947) which was initially published in the monograph of translations, *The Rediscovery of the Human*, mentioned above. The second writing, “Ten Theses concerning the ‘Person’”, is a translation of “*Zehn Thesen über die Person*”, included in a short volume of essays by Frankl, entitled *Logos und Existenz* published by Amandus Verlag, Vienna in 1951. The third writing, “Psychological and Pastoral Counselling”, is a translation of “*Ärztliche und priesterliche Seelsorge*”, which appeared in a volume of lectures, originally held by Frankl for radio, entitled *Pathologie des Zeitgeistes – Radiofunkvorträge über Seelenheilkunde* (Vienna: Franz Deuticke Verlag, 1955). The fourth writing, “The Unconditioned Human”, translates pp. 52-60 of *Der unbedingte Mensch* (Vienna: Franz Deuticke Verlag, 1949). Here I wish to acknowledge Prof Dr W.J. Maas, who made available to me his abridged translation of this work. The fifth and final writing, translated in this volume as “The Science of the Soul” is a number of selections of Frankl’s contributions to a dialogue with Pinchas Lapide, published in their

book, *G-ttsuche und Sinnfrage*, Munich: Güterslohe Verlagshaus, 2005. The last four translations were first printed in the *Journal of Judaism and Civilization*, Volumes 3 (2001), 2 (1999) with a different title, 9 (2012), 11 (2016) respectively, and are here reproduced with permission. Rights and permission have been obtained for all the translations. I am the translator of all of these writings except “Medical and Religious Pastoral Care”, which was translated by Mrs Liesl Kosma, the late niece of Viktor Frankl.

My initial acquaintance with the work of Viktor Frankl and its importance was due to my friend, Dr Mat Gelman, who has encouraged and assisted me throughout with both research into, and dissemination of, the work of Viktor Frankl. The work of translation gave me an intimate sense of the spirit of Frankl’s work. Mrs Liesl Kosma, who lived in Melbourne, facilitated my exposure to some important early German works of Frankl. In most of my translations of Frankl’s work, a colleague, Dr Chris Wurm, has been a generous and highly expert reader and reviewer, who thereby helped to fine-tune my understanding of Frankl in general. My wife Miriam, as in virtually all my work, has striven, where she had the opportunity, to make my writing clearer.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the family of Viktor Frankl, Mrs Elly Frankl, Viktor Frankl’s widow, and Frankl’s son-in-law, Professor Franz Vesely, and a close friend of the Frankl family and worker for the Viktor Frankl Institut in Vienna, Professor Alex Batthyány, for their kind assistance over many years.

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